Is presidentialism over? – 05/28/2023 – Marcus Melo

During the election campaign, Lula referred to Bolsonaro as a “court jester”. “Presidentialism is over. Bolsonaro does not command anything, he is a hostage of Congress”. At the government’s first ministerial meeting, he acknowledged the risk of becoming one: “we don’t rule Congress, we depend on it.” Five months later, we already see the signs that the risk is materializing.

It was predictable: he is a hyper-minority president whose party holds 13% of the Chamber and who has the loyal support of a mere 130 deputies (1/4 of the chamber). This setting has existed in the past. But a lot has changed: the economy, stressed; the Legislature, much more centralized (legacy of the pandemic and Bolsonaro), much less fragmented, and with much more resources; the country turning right.

Yes, the government’s defeats went far beyond expectations. These are not lost battles in specific initiatives: the fate of the PM’s reorganization of the Executive reaches the very ability of the government to define the ministerial structure and distribute competences within it. It is the hard core of the Executive’s strategy in assembling the governing coalition. The failure here is unprecedented in Brazilian presidentialism. And it surprises above all because it started with an unexpected bonus (the 8th of January).

The way for the Executive to accommodate a congressional majority with different preferences involves, first of all, sharing the cabinet.

That’s why Lula created 17 new folders. Reorganization is a way to accommodate numerous interests. That’s why in hyperfragmented countries the ministries reach more than 70, as I’ve already discussed here in the column.

The government’s global strategy is new. Marked by a kind of hyperdelegation at home, he greatly underestimated the potential difficulties. On the external plane, the fruits that are easier to harvest, failure has turned into embarrassment.

At the intersection of the two planes, the environment is critical. The symbol of failure.

There are two polar scenarios in Executive-Legislative relations. The first is illustrated by the caesarism of the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, who, in response to the defeat of his health reform, dismissed ministerial officials and threatened: “the attempt to restrict the reforms could lead to revolution. What is needed is that the people are mobilized”. Call it the nightmare of Juan Linz (1926-2013): the dual legitimacy crisis when a minority president unilaterally tries to impose his agenda on Congress. The second would be a president who navigates the seas of governance in a full power-sharing model, characteristic of broad fronts.

Between one and the other there is a continuum of intermediate possibilities. All complicated.

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