“Occupation in favelas needs to be permanent”, says creator of Bope

Responsible for creating the group that gave rise to the Special Operations Battalion (Bope) in Rio de Janeiro, retired Military Police (PM) colonel Paulo César Amêndola, 74 years old, defends the permanent occupation of favelas, whether by the state government or by the federal government, given the growth in crime and the need to combat drug trafficking that plagues the state of Rio de Janeiro.

With the intensification of violence in the month of October, the state of Rio de Janeiro returned to the focus of the news for recording the murder of three doctors in a kiosk in Barra da Tijuca, in the capital, and the incineration of 35 buses and a train through militia in retaliation for the death of one of its leaders in a confrontation with the police.

“It is the permanent occupation of the State that will prevent many things from happening, such as arms and drug trafficking. That was the original idea of ​​the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units): a permanent occupation in the favelas. If there isn’t one, it’s dry ice” , says the former municipal secretary of Public Order of Rio de Janeiro.

Amêndola also highlighted that municipalities play a fundamental role in combating drug trafficking in the state. Because they are close to citizens, cities have more information about the local situation and can contribute to the state and the Union in combating criminal groups.

“Who is closest to the citizen, to those who suffer from insecurity? The municipalities. Inside the Maré favela there are several municipal schools. In other words, public employees who know what is happening. The municipality knows things. Even though it doesn’t have a police, he can forward this to the state body. The point is that this needs to be done with more vigor”, argues the retired military police officer.

Check the interview in full.

To what extent can the GLO of Ports and Airports, decreed by the federal government, be effective against international trafficking?

Almond: These measures that are being adopted are intended to address the effects of the problems. The issue is that the effects are not long-lasting and permanent. The troops come, stay for a few months, ostensibly resolve something in the places where they operate, and then leave. In other words, the causes, the reasons that provoke crimes are not addressed. Prevention work needs to be done, such as the overt presence of the police. This work prevents criminals from acting. The authorities know perfectly well what the causes of this situation are. Another thing to talk about is that [elas] need to give their participation.

In the case of GLO do Mar, can the presence of the Navy effectively make a difference in containing drug trafficking?

Almond: I don’t have faith that this will resolve because this is temporary. The Navy has its own missions and they are important, but it deploys its personnel for additional support in a short period of time. I cannot say, despite the staff being well structured, that they are perfectly qualified to work in the field of Public Security.

Inspection of the place where drugs are transported depends on detailed intelligence work, which the Navy has. But I don’t believe it will mobilize this contingent for more intense work. It’s not the type of mission that is part of the Navy’s day-to-day flow.

The Transport Mafia and smuggled cigarettes from Paraguay are important components in financing crime in Rio de Janeiro, generating more revenue than drug trafficking. Can we say that it is necessary to intensify the fight against these practices?

Almond: Not only fight what comes from Paraguay, but also what comes from countries that border Brazil. Close border surveillance will prevent a lot of weapons and drug smuggling, obviously. But our border is an immensity. There are not enough personnel to maintain permanent surveillance. Not even at points considered critical for smugglers to enter. It has to be 24 hours a day, seven days a week and 30 days a month. But this is impractical.

Another aspect is the corruption of security agents, which the bodies to which they belong have every interest in putting an end to this, but a stronger toughness is needed on agents who provide the passage of materials that cannot enter the country. In terms of transport, greater rigor is needed, especially road and rail transport – which no one talks about.

Some of our railways pass through some nearby countries and there is no type of police. There are certainly weapons and drugs there. With the deactivation of the Federal Railway Police, which provided an excellent service, there is no supervision. If there is this integration between the Highway Police and the Railway Police, it will certainly become more difficult for drugs to enter the country.

Forty years ago, then-Rio governor Leonel Brizola restricted police operations in Rio’s favelas. After that, the state saw crime soar. Can we say that this decision strengthened crime?

Almond: I was on active duty when this happened. When this type of decision is made, it is the same as giving carte blanche to allow crime to continue. He [Brizola] prevented the police from fulfilling the police role of arresting criminals, seizing weapons, drugs, etc. The numbers [da violência na época] do not lie.

To the extent that there is a political decision preventing the police from carrying out what the law requires them to do, we can understand that the state government is leaving room for the marginalized to increase their level of boldness and carry out their criminal missions as if there was government approval. You cannot have free land in the state for anyone to commit a crime.

And today we have ADPF 635, in the STF, which repeats what happened in the past.

Almond: It’s the same film, but with the support of Brasília. Everything was caused by a political party. To the extent that there is tolerance of the good, there is audacity of the bad.

The dominance of drug trafficking shows the problem of territoriality in Rio. The State is unable to occupy these areas and the population is at its mercy. How to resolve this?

Almond: The issue is not very easy to resolve. There was a great degree of leniency from the political field, and even collusion, allowing the occupation of urban land. The first federative entity that must take care of this is the municipality. “Inspection of the occupation of urban land is the responsibility of the municipality” – it is stipulated in the constitution. Of course, in certain situations it is the duty of the state government. As the mayor does not have armed municipal police, he cannot prevent the occupation. But he can ask the state for support. It turns out that this was often not met and the favelas grew.

But I say again: It is the permanent occupation of the State that will prevent many things from happening, such as arms and drug trafficking. This was the original idea of ​​the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units): a permanent occupation in the favelas. If there isn’t, wipe the ice.

In October we had the theft of weapons from the Army. Being high caliber equipment, what would happen if these weapons were in the possession of organized crime?

Almond: It’s one thing to have weapons, it’s another thing to have ammunition. I have no news about the entry of heavy ammunition into the country. It’s the type of ammunition that isn’t made in the favela. Without ammunition, the weapon becomes useless. The damage they would cause, with little ammunition and with the Army’s intelligence behind, would be little.

In the debate about what is best for Public Security, there is the discourse defended by the left that advocates the demilitarization of the Military Police. In the current scenario, doesn’t this go against what Rio’s security needs?

Almond: That’s bullshit. If the police do not have the basic principles that guide militarism, it will not work well. A man who wears a uniform and puts a gun on his waist needs to have a martial stance. He can’t be a bum. He needs to provide security to the population. Personally speaking, it is not the military regime that transmits security, but it is certain values ​​and attributes imposed in the military career that are important.

For example: there is a Special Resources Coordination (Core) in Rio de Janeiro. She acts in uniform, as if she were a soldier. They, as civil police officers, chose the military framework, the military posture. They understood that if there wasn’t that discipline, they wouldn’t be the elite unit that they are.

How can municipalities act in the fight against organized crime?

Almond: I have the theory that everyone should protect their backyard: Union, states and municipalities. Everyone needs to look for their available security forces to protect their region. But, at the same time, there needs to be good coordination between the federative entities and between the powers: Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. Who is closest to the citizen, to those who suffer from insecurity? The municipalities.

For example: within the Maré favela there are several municipal schools. In other words, public officials who know what is happening. The municipality knows things. Even though he doesn’t have a police force, he can forward this to the state agency. The point is that this needs to be done more vigorously. If there is coordination between municipalities and states about this information – which only the municipalities know -, things work.