The imaginary demand for populists – 04/30/2023 – Marcus Melo

Many analysts argue in an apocalyptic tone that satisfaction with democracy has collapsed, trust in politicians, parties and governments has collapsed, and populist sentiment has exploded. “All this sounds amazing. But at least as far as the attitudes and preferences of the average European citizen are concerned none of this is true.” The conclusion is drawn by Larry Bartels in Democracy erodes from the top: leaders, citizens and the challenge of populism in Europe (Princeton, 2023).

A central reference in the area of ​​public opinion and democratic theory, Bartels examines trends in public opinion in 23 European countries (350,000 respondents), between 2000 and 2019 —a period in which changes in the attitudes and preferences of the electorate would have occurred. He finds immense global stability and isolated volatility; but warns that outliers receive disproportionate prominence. The argument that public opinion movements are not predictors of a democracy crisis was also defended by Adam Przeworski, who recalls that six months before Pinochet’s coup, 73% of Chileans were against the measure.

As Bartels shows, support for democracy in autocracies like Venezuela and China is similar to that of democracies.

Bartels estimates so-called right-wing “populist sentiment” with an impressive database of 785 million observations, relating to 43 elections. The evidence runs counter to the canonical explanation: the populist wave cannot be explained by changes in public opinion following the eurozone crisis and the 2009-2012 immigration shock. to the European Union are slightly higher after the crisis than before. Nor is there evidence of major shifts in left vs right self-positioning or support for redistribution. Sentiment about immigration in the electorate has not changed.

Institutional erosion, in the isolated cases where they succeed, is triggered from above. Orbán, the canon case, became leader of Fidesz, a centrist party, not Jobbik, Hungary’s radical right party.

The supply of populist parties has increased, but on average they are small parties, whose votes grew by only 10% in the period, double the rate between 1980-2000, or in the post-war period; there has always been a radical right wing hovering around 1/5th and 1/6th of the electorate. Democracy is strained by leaders who have mobilized this critical reserve at specific junctures and in vulnerable institutional environments.

The widespread view of the crisis and death of democracies, already discussed here in the column, is forcefully rejected in yet another seminal contribution.

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