Russian spy worked in Brasília embassy to recruit informants

Russian spy worked in Brasília embassy to recruit informants

[ad_1]

Investigation shows that a spy offered scholarships and opportunities at Russian universities to co-opt informants.| Photo: reproduction/Google Maps

A Russian spy working inside the Russian embassy in Brasília was discovered by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) trying to recruit Brazilians from sectors of interest to act as informants for the country.

The information was released this Monday (8) by the newspaper Newspaper and confirmed to People’s Gazette by sources from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is following the case. The ministry did not officially comment.

Abin informed the reporter that “it does not deny or confirm cases of counterintelligence”.

According to the investigation, Serguei Alexandrovitch Chumilov arrived in Brazil in 2018 to serve as first secretary at the embassy, ​​and also identified himself as a representative of the Russian House in Brazil (Russky Dom), linked to the federal agency Rossotrudnichestvo focused on cooperation. international humanitarian.

Chumilov was removed from Brazil in July last year by the Russian government after Abin notified Itamaraty, which made official communication to the Moscow government.

The investigation indicates that the spy aimed to obtain information about sectors or topics of interest to Russian intelligence. He took advantage of his diplomatic status to carry out espionage functions, using methods such as offering scholarships and exchange programs in Russia to attract Brazilian students and academics.

Chumilov actively participated in events promoting scholarships at Russian universities. In a lecture held in 2022 at a college in Brasília, he highlighted the agency’s work in promoting Russian culture and education, as well as presenting study opportunities for those interested.

Also according to the investigation, the method adopted by Chumilov to recruit spies – called “cultivation” – is focused on the long term and under diplomatic cover. In some cases, these people only realize their participation in the scheme when they are already deeply involved, which makes it difficult to leave the informant network.

[ad_2]

Source link