Intervener points out lack of operational plan by PM of DF on January 8 – 01/27/2023 – Power

The intervenor in public security in the Federal District, Ricardo Cappelli, stated in a report on the acts of January 8 that the Military Police of the DF did not draw up an operational plan to contain the coup leaders who attacked the headquarters of the Three Powers.

The person responsible for carrying out the planning, Colonel Jorge Eduardo Naime Barreto, former head of the PMDF’s Operational Department, was on vacation.

“There was no prior preparation of Operational Planning or Order of Service issued by the Operational Department of the PMDF in relation to the facts of 01/08/2023”, says the report obtained by Sheet.

Cappelli points out that there was only one Plan of Integrated Actions, prepared by the Secretariat of Public Security, without highlighting actions for police shock battalions, “which deviates from the operational pattern of previous demonstrations”.

Without defined planning, according to the intervenor, it is not possible to know which PMDF personnel were on the Esplanada dos Ministérios at the beginning of the acts.

The document corroborates the version presented by former Public Security number 2 Fernando de Sousa Oliveira, who told the PF (Federal Police) that Anderson Torres left the country without giving him a “guideline” or presenting it to the commanders of the police forces.

Internal reports point out that there would be a number of 555 military police in the central area and in the Esplanada dos Ministérios, a fact that “seems not to be in line with the images captured by the SSPDF video surveillance cameras”.

“Despite the existing information, the number of military personnel deployed on the ground was insufficient to contain the access of the demonstrators, mainly regarding the search line located on the N1 road at the height of the Buraco do Tatuí, allowing demonstrators to break through the device and enter with prohibited materials on the Esplanade and on the containment line on Avenida das Bandeiras, which resulted in the invasion of the National Congress”, he adds.

The report was prepared by Ricardo Cappelli as one of his last works at the head of public security in the DF. The material reconstitutes the events of the 6th to the 9th of January which, according to the intervenor, would have contributed to the coup plotters invading and destroying the headquarters of the Three Powers.

Intelligence from the Public Security Secretariat of the Federal District delivered a report on the risks of the demonstration to the then head of the ministry, Anderson Torres, on January 6, as Folha showed.

“It can be concluded that there was no lack of information and warnings about the risks of the demonstration”, says the report.

According to Cappelli, there were a series of failures in the preparation of the Military Police of the DF that facilitated the invasion of the vandals. In the internal documents, for example, there was no provision for activating battalions specialized in containing civil disturbances, such as BOPE, BPCÃES, BAVOP AND RPMON.

“It is important to highlight the existence of information that a portion of the troops allocated to reinforce the troops that were on the Esplanade were on standby at home.”

The report also points out that it was only at 3 pm that the PMDF Administrative Complex, which had been on standby since the previous day, was called in to start mobilization.

“There was, therefore, an interval of approximately two hours between the beginning of the demonstration and the taking of operational reinforcement measures to repress the ongoing actions”, states Cappelli in the document.

The images of the internal circuit of the STF (Federal Supreme Court), released on Wednesday (25), still demonstrated that the “passive attitude and absence of any planning by the DOP —Department of Operations of the PM— exposed the STF in an unacceptable way” .

The PMDF Corregedoria opened an inquiry on Thursday (26) to investigate the conduct of the military police officers involved in the case.

Cappelli also pointed out that, in addition to Colonel Jorge Naime, six other battalion commanders and two PMDF area heads were on vacation on the day of the attack. All were subordinate to Naime.

Former PM commander Fábio Augusto Vieira, arrested by decision of the STF, has part of the performance described in the report. According to the intervenor, Vieira acted directly during the acts of January 8, making calls and requesting reinforcement in policing.

“Although he was personally operating in the field, evidence indicates that the colonel lost the ability to lead his direct subordinates, as his requests for reinforcement were neither promptly considered nor responded to,” the report says.

Ricardo Cappelli also points out that the camp set up by supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) in front of the Army HQ, in Brasília, served as “logistical support and a place of concentration” for protesters for the actions of January 8.

The text highlights that two operations to dismantle the camp, in partnership with the Secretariat of Public Security, were canceled by the Army in November and December, as revealed by the Sheet. Another action was interrupted during the dismantling, after hostility from Bolsonaristas.

The interventor also pointed out that the action to dismantle the camp and arrest the coup leaders took place on the morning of January 9 after “intervention by General [Gustavo Henrique] Dutra, military commander of the Planalto, who considered that the action would only take place the next day in the morning”.

Such as Sheet showed, the decision was taken after the interventor ordered the police to enter the area close to the headquarters, whose jurisdiction is the Brazilian Army, which positioned three war tanks to prevent PMDF action.

After tense meetings involving the intervenor, ministers of the Lula government (PT) and generals, the consensus was for the dismantling operation to take place as planned the next day, in the morning.