What kind of institutional arrangement ensures better political governance? – 07/23/2023 – Marcus Melo

What kind of institutional arrangement ensures better political governance? For a long time, the debate revolved around two polar options: parliamentarism and presidentialism. Its classic formulation is in Bagehot, The English Constitution, published in 1867. Bagehot is closer to us than the reader suspects. He was a lawyer and journalist, founder of The Economist. Joaquim Nabuco discovered it in the novelties of the Lailhacar bookshop in Recife, as early as 1869.

The fascination he exerted on Nabuco is such that he entitled the second chapter of his Minha Formação, “Bagehot”. It was the seed of ideas for him and a whole generation, including Rui Barbosa. For Bagehot, parliamentarism was a superior model for two reasons: efficiency and the clarity of accountability it allowed. Efficiency resulted from the “efficient secret”: the fusion of Executive-Legislative Powers in the cabinet government, guaranteeing efficiency and governability.

The parties offered different platforms, until the mood of public opinion turned against it, leading to the alternation of power. The concentration of political authority had as its counterpart the maximization of accountability because the veto points are minimal. Presidentialism, he argued, separated the Powers, divided the government, creating impasses in Executive-Legislative relations. The clarity of responsibility was compromised by not knowing who is politically responsible (President? Legislative? Judiciary?).

This normative ideal of “Responsible Government” was hegemonic in political science until the 1970s. The discussion on government systems was replaced by the confrontation between majoritarian models (the United Kingdom is a paradigm) versus the so-called “consociative” or “consensual”, characterized by multipartyism, large coalitions, powerful Judiciary and decentralized arrangements (eg Germany or Denmark).

The new prevailing normative ideal is that bargaining and consensus ensure less volatility in public policy. Efficiency gains occur in the long term; greater inclusiveness generates accountability deficit but more consensus. Lijphart and many other political scientists have done empirical work on both models.

Brazil adopts a hybrid system with a strong predominance of consociative traits. But among us degenerate forms of both stand out. Consociativism creates the perception of generalized collusion and immobility. A system aimed at capturing rents and very little clarity of responsibility. Our major pathology is executives who abuse power and assume they are representatives of the nation as a whole, not just minorities.

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