NASA quarantine after Apollo 11 mission failed – 06/20/2023 – Science

When Apollo 11 astronauts went to the Moon in July 1969, NASA was concerned about their safety during the complex flight. The space agency was also concerned about what astronauts might bring back to Earth.

For years before the mission took off, officials feared that the moon could harbor microorganisms. What if lunar microbes survived the return trip and caused lunar fever on Earth?

To control this possibility, NASA planned to quarantine people, instruments, samples taken, and space vehicles that would come into contact with lunar material.

But in an article published this month in the history of science journal Isis, environmental historian Dagomar Degroot of Georgetown University demonstrates that these “planetary protection” efforts have fallen short to a degree that until now was not widely known.

“The quarantine protocol appears to have been a success,” Degroot concludes in the study. “But only because it wasn’t necessary.”

The historian’s archival research work also reveals that NASA knew that lunar microbes could pose an existential threat (although the likelihood of that threat was low) and that, should such a danger exist, the lunar quarantine would probably not keep Earth at bay. security. In any case, they characterized their ability to neutralize that risk as being greater than it actually was.

Degroot’s article says that this space-age narrative is an example of the tendency present in science projects to downplay existential risks that are unlikely and difficult to deal with, opting instead to focus on smaller, more likely problems. The text also offers useful lessons as NASA and other space agencies prepare to collect samples from Mars and other worlds in the solar system to study on Earth.

In the 1960s nobody knew if there was life on the Moon. But scientists were sufficiently concerned about this possibility that the National Academy of Sciences convened a high-level conference in 1964 to discuss Moon-Earth contamination. “They agreed that the risk was real and the consequences could be profound,” Degroot said.

Scientists also agreed that quarantining anything that came from the moon was both necessary and pointless: humans were unlikely to be able to contain a microscopic threat. The most Earthlings could do was delay the release of microbes until scientists developed a countermeasure.

Despite these conclusions, NASA publicly declared that it could protect the planet. It spent tens of millions of dollars to build a sophisticated quarantine center, the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. “But for all that beautiful complexity, basic, fundamental mistakes were made,” Degroot said.

NASA was well aware that the lab was not perfect. Degroot’s article details many of the findings from inspections and tests that revealed glove boxes and sterilization autoclaves that cracked, leaked or flooded.

In the weeks after the Apollo 11 crew returned, 24 professionals were exposed to the lunar material that the center’s infrastructure was supposed to protect them from. They had to be quarantined. Degroot wrote that the containment flaws were “largely hidden from the public”.

Emergency laboratory procedures—for example, in case of fire or medical problems—also required breaking down the insulation.

“This turned out to be an example of planetary security protection theater,” commented Jordan Bimm, a historian of science at the University of Chicago. He did not participate in Degroot’s research.

The very return to Earth of the Apollo 11 astronauts put the planet at risk. Their vehicle, for example, was designed to release air during descent, and astronauts were supposed to open the hatch into the ocean.

In a 1965 memo, a NASA official said the agency had a moral obligation to avoid potential contamination, even if doing so required changing the mission’s weight, cost, or schedule. But four years later, on returning to Earth, the spacecraft released air anyway and the interior of the capsule came into contact with the Pacific.

“If lunar organisms capable of reproducing in Earth’s ocean had been present, it would have been the end of us,” said John Rummel, who served two terms as NASA’s planetary protection officer.

The probability of such organisms existing was very small. But the consequences of their existence, if proven, would be tremendous — and the Apollo program essentially agreed to face them on behalf of the planet.

Degroot said this tendency to minimize existential risks and instead prioritize risks that are more likely but whose consequences would be less severe is seen in fields such as climate change, nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence.

On the Apollo mission, officials not only downplayed the risks, they were not transparent about them.

“Failing is part of learning,” Bimm said, referencing the inappropriate quarantine.

Understanding what didn’t work will be important as NASA prepares to return samples from Mars in the 2030s. Mars is a place far more likely than the Moon to harbor life.

Nick Bernardini, NASA’s current head of planetary protection, says that since the Apollo mission the space agency has learned a lot about planetary protection. She’s been building protections in from the beginning and running workshops to understand the scientific gaps. And it’s already working on a Mars sample lab.

NASA also intends to be transparent with the public. “Risk communication and communication as a whole is extremely important,” said Bernardini. After all, he pointed out, “what is at stake is the Earth’s biosphere”.

It’s hard to imagine the biosphere at risk from alien organisms, but the chances are not nonexistent. “Unlikely risks that would have serious consequences matter a lot,” Degroot said. “Mitigating them is one of the most important things governments can do.”

^{Translated by Clara Allain}