Lula’s seven mistakes that almost led the government to collapse

The third term of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) completed five months on Wednesday (31), marking a period of growing tensions faced by the government, mainly due to the tumultuous relations with the Legislative. After suffering several important defeats in votes in Congress, the deputies almost let the deadline expire on Thursday (1st) to vote on the provisional measure aimed at reorganizing the ministerial structure proposed by the president, which would result in the dismissal of 15 of the 37 ministers and making dozens of programs unfeasible.

This almost unprecedented administrative collapse is the result of a combination of political disarticulation, inability to form a sufficient parliamentary base to approve projects and repeated failures to deal with the warnings issued by power actors, especially the mayor, Arthur Lira (PP -AL). According to analysts consulted by the People’s Gazette, like the political scientists José Amorim and Ismael de Almeida, the struggle faced by the experienced Lula can be attributed to seven primary mistakes he made.

1. Lula remains on the platform of the electoral campaign

After emerging victorious in the most disputed election in republican history and committing to form a government with a broad front, seeking support from other sectors of a strongly divided society, Lula preferred to continue with his electoral discourse and in a tone of revenge.

By deepening political polarization and fomenting social tensions, inciting conflicts and promoting divisions between different groups, Lula abandoned his bet on unity and constructive dialogue and did not expand his parliamentary and population support base. The expectation of the political center was to receive more pragmatic nods for pacification after the polls, but what happened was the hostility of influential sectors, such as agribusiness and evangelical churches.

2. Choice of articulators on the left

Another mistake made by Lula that ended up fomenting crises was the choice of political articulators ideologically more aligned to the left and who nourish personal projects that conflict with each other. This option undermined the government’s ability to articulate alliances and build a solid base of support in Congress, making it difficult to pass important measures and causing political instability.

More than once, party leaders and the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Arthur Lira (PP-AL), complained about the lack of prestige with articulators, excessive centralization in meeting demands in the Civil House, commanded by Rui Costa (PT-AL). BA), contradictory signs of different names and, finally, the absence of the president himself, outsourcing the dialogue to assistants.

3. Statist and interventionist agenda

Without having correctly read the dominant center-right profile of Congress, especially in the Chamber, where his faithful base is no more than 150 out of 513 deputies, Lula insisted on carrying out a broad agenda for an unfeasible government.

With the review of structural reforms already approved, statist and interventionist projects in the economy and the prevalence of other customary themes, the president produced a series of attrition with parliament and wasted opportunities.

This failure was aggravated by the systematic fight against the independence of the Central Bank, the privatization of Eletrobrás and the new Sanitation Framework. The controversies generated impasses and led the presidents of the Chamber and of the Senate, supported by the productive sector, to frame the president and dictate the rhythm of the agendas considered in fact important and of interest to the country, as a fiscal milestone, in progress in the Senate, and the tax reform, which is still being discussed in the Chamber.

4. Outsourcing the role of negotiator

The position of president in a presidential regime is that of negotiator of an agenda that he proposes to society and Congress. Lula bet all his chips on rescuing symbols of past administrations and promoted the delegation of this negotiating role to palatial ministers and leaders in Congress.

Lacking the necessary power and with divergent views, third-party negotiators increased internal and external tensions and conflicts, questioned the government’s own policies and, finally, weakened governability.

The start of the government in Congress turned out to be the worst in the last 20 years, with the president allowing an unprecedented number of provisional measures to expire in the first month after taking office, leading rivals, friends and occasional supporters to question where the experience of Lula, who returned to power under special circumstances that required intense personal work to obtain all the necessary support to succeed.

5. Priority to the international agenda

According to analysts interviewed by Gazeta do Povo, a misunderstanding by Lula that was becoming more pronounced month after month occurred in his international agenda, to which he dedicated absolute priority, relegating internal and urgent issues to the background, missing deadlines and opportunities.

The result of this was the contamination of the political environment in the face of controversial alliances, erratic and contradictory diplomatic actions, especially with regard to the conflict in Eastern Europe and even unexpected confrontation of American leadership on the international stage.

This posture generated diplomatic tensions, with emphasis on the defense of the Venezuelan dictatorship, affected the relationship with other countries and diverted the focus from the real problems. At this point, the use of the National Bank for Economic and Sustainable Development (BNDES) to bail out defaulting countries like Brazil generated extra noise. Even the expressive international political support obtained in the environmental agenda suffered losses with the debate on oil exploration at the mouth of the Amazon.

6. Breaking promises to parliamentarians

A crucial mistake for Lula that led to a series of defeats in the Chamber – with the dehydration of the Ministries of the Environment and Indigenous Peoples, suspension of decrees in the sanitation framework and setting of a time frame for the demarcation of indigenous reserves (the latter two still under analysis in the Senate) – was to stop the transfer of funds agreed with party leaders and the delay in defining second and third-level positions.

This compliance with agreements, always remembered, provoked widespread complaints and damaged the government’s relationship with political parties and undermined the confidence of parliamentarians, making it difficult to approve projects and increasing political tensions.

By investing against the so-called secret budget, Lula mistakenly believed he had changed the correlation of forces in the Chamber and relied only on his personal charisma to increase his popularity and influence.

7. Inaction on Congressional Stalemates

Finally, analysts point out that the government made the mistake of taking a long time to react and contain growing impasses, such as the duel between the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate regarding the processing of the Provisional Measures.

In addition, explicit support for rivals of the mayor, Arthur Lira, such as Senator Renan Calheiros (MDB-AL), Davi Alcolumbre and Rodrigo Pacheco, increased the climate of instability and weakened governance, affecting the ability to approve measures important in Congress.

When the president realized the risk of meddling in parochial disputes and empowering less important allies in the political scenario, such as Minister Daniela do Waguinho (Tourism), without listening to all the grassroots leaders, Lula also gave space to the more explicit opposition, represented by the PL and other congressmen closer to former president Jair Bolsonaro (PL) to reorganize and occupy important spaces, such as thematic commissions and the opening of parliamentary commissions of inquiry.

These seven mistakes contributed to putting the government on the verge of a ministerial dismantling, causing political instability, difficulties in approving reforms and generating strain in relations with different sectors of society.

Overcoming these errors will require a complete review of the political strategy, greater dialogue with different sectors and a more pragmatic attitude, centered on the search for consensual solutions. The first step, analysts point out, should be a ministerial reform. However, Lula has already indicated, at least publicly, that he is not considering changing ministers at this time.