Lula on 8/1: Discussion about GLO had a hit on the table – 01/06/2024 – Power

President Lula (PT) watched the scenes of vandalism in the buildings of the Three Powers and debated with ministers the solution to put an end to the coup attacks in Brasília, on January 8, 2023, when he reacted vehemently to the possibility of decreeing a GLO (Guarantee of Law and Order) — which would consist of calling in the Armed Forces to contain the acts.

According to reports, the president banged the table and indignantly stated that, if the military wanted power, they should contest the elections.

“In the conversations I had with minister Flávio Dino [da Justiça], and there were many conversations, among several things he told me, he suggested that one of the possibilities was to do GLO. And I said there would be no GLO. I wouldn’t do GLO because whoever wants power should contest the elections and win, like I won the elections”, said Lula, in a statement sent to Sheet about the events of that day.

“Why would I, with eight days in government, give other people the power to resolve a crisis that I thought had to be resolved through politics? And it was resolved through politics,” continued the president.

The decision to reject the GLO and opt for an intervention in the Federal District was taken amid a climate of distrust regarding what the military would do with power in hand, in the face of pressure from supporters of Jair Bolsonaro (PL) for a coup

That day, authorities involved in responding to the attacks came to assess that the solution would be the decree — which some military personnel wanted to use to try to remove Lula from power.

When he spoke to Lula, Dino was at the Ministry of Justice, where he could watch the scenes of vandalism. The minister told the president that it was necessary to take control of the situation because the Federal District police did not contain Bolsonaro’s supporters.

In one of the conversations cited by Lula, Dino presented a menu of options to regain control: GLO, intervention in the Federal District, state of siege or defense.

The last two options were considered extreme and Lula rejected them. The first lady, Rosângela Lula da Silva, known as Janja, also spoke out against the GLO. According to reports, she stood up from her chair and stated that this would mean handing over civilian power to the military.

Lula also spoke with Minister José Múcio (Defense), who reportedly said that military commanders were available to act. After that, the president rejected the GLO hypothesis once and for all.

The atmosphere in the crisis office set up at Araraquara City Hall (SP), where Lula had gone to assist victims of heavy rain, was pure tension, according to those who were there.

Lula spoke to his ministers and Congressional authorities at all times. Exalted, he searched for information and solutions.

According to reports, he shouted on the phone with General Gonçalves Dias, then minister of the GSI (Institutional Security Office), and asked if something would be done. On the other end of the line, the minister replied that guards had already arrived at the scene.

Lula spoke with Rosa Weber, at the time president of the STF (Supreme Federal Court), and with minister Alexandre de Moraes, president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court).

Moraes blamed the situation on Governor Ibaneis Rocha (MDB-DF) and the then Secretary of Security of the Federal District, Anderson Torres, and pointed out the need for a response.

The presidents of the Chamber, Arthur Lira (PP-AL), and the Senate, Rodrigo Pacheco (PSD-MG), were also called and spoke to the president.

Lula rejected the possibility of GLO in calls with ministers Rui Costa (Civil House), Alexandre Padilha (Institutional Relations) and Jorge Messias (Attorney General of the Union). In a call, the president was informed about the actions that the AGU was preparing against DF authorities.

With the GLO discarded, the decision was made to intervene in the DF. Dino wrote a decree that initially provided for the removal of Governor Ibaneis and federal intervention in the entire capital.

Afterwards, however, Lula asked the minister for specific intervention in the area of ​​security, without removing the governor from office. Ibaneis would end up removed that same night, by decision of Moraes.

Lula wanted Dino as an intervenor, but the minister found that he could not because he had been elected senator. Alexandre Padilha (Secretariat of Institutional Relations) was considered as a second option, but there were also objections.

Dino then suggested his executive secretary, Ricardo Cappelli. Lula didn’t know him, but he heard references and agreed to highlight him for the role.

The intervention decree was sent to Lula via WhatsApp for him to sign. The president then called a press conference in Araraquara. He read the act and stated that the protesters were true vandals.

He said at the time: “It is necessary that these people are punished in an exemplary way, that no one ever dares again, with the national flag on their back or a team t-shirt, to pretend to be nationalists, to pretend to be Brazilians and do what they did today” .

According to those who were with the president, he wanted to return to Brasília as soon as possible, but there were considerations regarding his safety.

“There were people who didn’t want me to come to Brasília, [mas] returned to São Paulo. That instead of me coming here from Araraquara, I should stay there and I said: no. I’m going to Brasília, I’m going to the hotel and I’m going to the Palace. I won the elections, I took office. The people gave me the right to be president for four years. I will not escape my responsibility. And it was resolved through politics,” the president responded to Sheet.

Back in Brasília, at night, Lula inspected the Planalto Palace and went to the STF for a meeting with Rosa Weber and other ministers.

At that point, the president was already articulating the reaction for the following day. On January 9, he gathered governors at Planalto, in addition to the presidents of the three Powers, and then set out on a walk towards the court.

January 8th only ended in the early hours of the morning. Lula had ordered the arrest of all protesters who had returned to the camp in front of the Army Headquarters.

When Cappelli arrived at the scene, however, the military did not want the arrests to be made, on the grounds that there would be conflict with the Military Police.

Lula then received a call from the camp at around 9pm. It was General Gustavo Henrique Dutra, then military commander of Planalto, who appealed to the president to leave the prisons for the following day.

Lula agreed, but, after the dialogue, he ordered ministers Múcio, Dino and Rui to negotiate a solution.

At the end of the conversations, in the early hours of the morning, ministers went to the hotel where Lula was staying in Brasília to talk about the operation the following day, when the camp was finally vacated. They also talked about an act that would involve several authorities in defense of democracy.

“The gesture of everyone meeting here at Palácio do Planalto and then visiting the Supreme Court was a very strong gesture, which I think is the photograph that the Brazilian people will remember forever and we will never want to listen to again to people who don’t like democracy,” the president told Sheet.