Jesters and Executive-Legislative Relations – 03/12/2023 – Marcus Melo

In the first ministerial meeting of his government, President Lula recognized his hyper-minority character: “we don’t command Congress, we depend on it”. But during the campaign, he criticized Bolsonaro for being “a court jester”: “Bolsonaro doesn’t command anything, he is a hostage of the National Congress”.

In turn, in the Jornal Nacional Saturday, Bolsonaro, when asked about his dependence on Congress, reacted: “Bonner, are you encouraging me to be a dictator? .

Thus, there is strong continuity in Executive-Legislative relations fundamentally determined by high party fragmentation. But the similarities stop there. The strategies are distinct and explain Lula’s apparent turn to the left.

Bolsonaro began his government rejecting “the old policy”, but embarked on a hyper-delegation of powers to the Legislative, in the figure of the leaders of the two houses, which materialized in the secret budget (OS): the rapporteur’s amendments (RP9) grew to the detriment of resources ministries’ discretion.

Lula allied himself with the centrão even before taking office, guaranteeing the approval of the spending ceiling PEC. The STF decided that the OS was unconstitutional and the rearrangement negotiated between the Executive and the centrão was that half of the expenses would take the form of individual amendments, which are mandatory. The remainder would return to ministries; would be subject to negotiations with parliamentarians, under the discretion of the Executive. The government has just delegated to the Minister of Institutional Relations the centralization of these negotiations; and Congress, to anabolize the Commission Amendments (RP-8), which went from R$ 90 million to R$ 6.5 billion, bypassing the STF. Semi-secret budget?

The bargaining chips now include —in a more institutionalized way— ministries and positions for the base. Support now generates reputational costs concentrated on the president (see Juscelino Filho affair). Hyperdelegation under Bolsonaro was also a strategy to avoid these costs: “it’s not up to me”.

If rapprochement with the centrão represents a centripetal bargaining movement, how can one explain the centrifugal movement in which the president radicalizes in foreign policy and in relation to Bacen? The leftism of foreign policy is a form of compensation for the alliance with the centrão. This is not something new. The episode at the Central Bank contrasts markedly with what happened in Chile under Boric and with Lula 1, who outsourced the criticism of Bacen to Fiesp and the vice president. It fundamentally reflects the fear of a strong popular reaction if the economy collapses.

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