Government will have to explain Abin reports at the CPI of 1/8 – 05/01/2023 – Power

The mixed CPI of January 8th in Congress is the space in which it will be possible to point to all public bodies and authorities that somehow failed or omitted to attack the buildings of the three Powers.

With members of the base and the opposition, the commission will be able to take advantage of the political dispute to go beyond the Federal District authorities identified as missing by the investigations of the Federal Police and scrutinize how each agency and federal authority reacted, for example, to the alerts produced by Abin (Brazilian Intelligence Agency).

The Abin reports revealed by the Sheet point to many questions that the CPI will have to answer in the line of investigation about who are the possible omissive authorities and how the public agencies, especially the federal ones, failed to the point of having their three main buildings invaded and vandalized.

At the district level, in addition to the PF investigations, a CPI in the District Chamber is already investigating those responsible.

At the federal level, although operational responsibilities are more restricted, since the Government of the DF is responsible for security in the federal capital, it is necessary to know if all possible measures were taken and if there were basic attempts to mitigate the effects of the onslaught of Bolsonaristas encamped at the Army HQ against the three Powers.

The CPI was opened, after months of opposing action by the governing base, after the emergence of doubts about how the Lula government (PT) acted with the dissemination by CNN Brasil of the internal images of the Planalto Palace.

The document sent by Abin to Congress states that at least since Friday (6) information on the possibility of violent acts of invasion of the three Powers has been sent to the main intelligence agencies in the country and in the Federal District.

The documents contradict the testimony of the former minister of the GSI (Institutional Security Office) Gonçalves Dias, the positions of other members of the government and the speech of President Lula himself in his first interview after the January 8th to GloboNews.

Abin is the intelligence agency responsible for directly advising the President of the Republic.

After stating that he left Brasilia that Friday because he was informed that “everything was quiet”, Lula stated that the federal intelligence system “did not exist”, citing for the first time the so-called “intelligence blackout” – later quoted by GDias to the PF.

“We have Army intelligence, we have GSI intelligence, we have Abin intelligence, we have Navy intelligence, we have Air Force intelligence. The truth is that none of these intelligences served to warn the President of the Republic that this could have happened,” said Lula.

All the intelligence cited by Lula and others, such as the Security Secretariat of the DF, according to Abin documents, knew since the 6th of the possibility of violent acts.

GDias itself, the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Police and the Federal Highway Police, among other bodies and authorities, also received at 7:40 pm on Friday the report on the risk of violent acts and invasions of buildings, in addition to the call for demonstrators to Brasília, with citation to the use of weapons.

GDias would have received several reports on his own WhatsApp from the 6th of January until the beginning of the attacks, around 3 pm on the 8th.

Of the total, three messages would have been forwarded exclusively to the former minister, without transfer to the bodies that make up Sisbin (Brazilian Intelligence System).

The documents also show that at least three structures linked to the Ministry of Justice received the reports: the Ministry’s Intelligence Directorate, the Federal Police and the Federal Highway Police.

All were part of an intelligence cell of the Federal District Security Secretariat recreated after the alerts on Friday and received the information.

One of the points that the CPI will be able to investigate is why these federal bodies, such as the Ministry of Justice, the GSI and the former minister himself, deny having received information from Abin.

In this scenario, where did this information go?

Or, in another possibility, did the intelligence agency responsible for advising the president fail to disseminate the information, although it produced it, and failed to get it to the authorities with decision-making power?

If Abin and the federal intelligence system did not fail, there is also another possible scenario, what measures were taken by each authority and public body to avoid the realization of the forecasts indicated in the reports?

Until now, in the government, in addition to the denials regarding the receipt of the Abin reports and the notes to the DF security forces, the latter, of course, with a large part of the responsibility according to the investigations, there was only criticism from Ricardo Capelli, current GSI interim minister, to the means used to send the reports: WhatsApp.

“It is not appropriate for confidential intelligence reports from a country to be passed on through a messaging application of a private company in a foreign nation. This is not about xenophobia or conspiracy. We are dealing with NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY,” he said on social media.

Abin, in turn, defends the method used on January 8 and which, according to the agency, “used efficiently in critical events such as the truck drivers’ movements in 2021, the acts of September 7, 2022, the elections 2022 and the presidential inauguration on January 1, 2023”.