Fernando Limongi: It is preferable to remove Bolsonaro by voting – 06/29/2023 – Politics

Jair Bolsonaro (PL) is detestable, but it is preferable to remove him from power by vote than by judicial means, says political scientist Fernando Limongi.

Professor at USP and FGV, he says he sees signs that the Judiciary is acting with an eye on the political consequence in the case of the former president, in the same way that he has been doing with all the representatives since the monthly allowance.

Author of the recently launched “Operação Impeachment – Dilma Rousseff e o Brasil da Lava Jato” (ed. However), Limongi points out the interference in particular in the case of the fall of the PT and in the case of the arrest and ineligibility of Lula (PT).

The political scientist praises the president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court), Minister Alexandre de Moraes, for the performance that he classifies as decisive for guaranteeing the 2022 election.

But he says he sees with concern what he considers a growing partisanship of the Federal Supreme Court with the appointment of ministers aligned with the President of the Republic at the time.

The TSE resumes this Friday (30) the trial of the action against Bolsonaro for the accusation of abuse of power in the meeting with ambassadors in which he attacked the electoral system. The score, for now, is at 3 to 1 by the declaration of ineligibility.

How do you see the possibility of, again, a popular politician being prevented from running for election by the Judiciary? If a politician committed a crime, was tried and convicted, and this crime means that he loses his political rights, ok, the Judiciary is fulfilling its function. But, if the politician is being prosecuted because it is intended that he lose his mandate, then it is not ok. I think that, in this case, we are closer to the second statement than the first.

What are the signs that this is happening? Obviously there was misuse of a Federal Police investigation that Bolsonaro cites in the conversation with the ambassadors. There is a crime there, but that is not how it is being justified. This same consequence could normally occur, for example, because of jewelry [recebidas da Arábia Saudita e barradas pela Receita]. There is much more evidence there of a crime committed which must result in the loss of a mandate.

It seems to me that the Brazilian Judiciary has a tendency lately to look at who is being sued, what the consequences will be and to particularize their action as much as possible, instead of thinking about the general aspect and the jurisprudence that is created.

But what indicates that there is a particularization in this judgment? The very rush with which this process is running, the discussion around the powers that Minister Moraes has been exercising, the previous decision regarding the [Deltan] Dallagnol. I don’t have the slightest sympathy either for Bolsonaro or for Dallagnol. It seems to me that in the case of Dallagnol, above all, there was a desire to catch him.

If it is to withdraw Bolsonaro’s political rights, it has to be something very solid and well-founded so that there is no stain that it was political revenge or a partisanship of the Judiciary. The Judiciary is not taking this precaution. He didn’t take it during the entire Lava Jato, which culminated in the impeachment, nor in Lula’s arrest and he’s not taking it again. This ends up taking away the legitimacy of this type of action.

And how do you see the issue from the point of view of interference in voter choice? The true sovereign is the voter, not the judiciary. In Lula’s case, the Judiciary clearly felt it had the right and duty to prevent him from returning to the Presidency. He considered it a risk and needed to protect the people. But in democracy, this is the role of the voter. In Bolsonaro’s case, if he commits a crime, he is like every citizen before the law, but a judgment cannot be made for political reasons. Great care must be taken not to convey the idea that the Judiciary is being exploited. It is preferable to have Bolsonaro in an electoral market and have him be defeated electorally than judges to take that position.

What is the possible parallel with Lula’s case and what are the differences? Each process is different, but the philosophy behind it seems to be the same, as if the Judiciary were the moderating power and should assume the role of voters. I think the Clean Record Law also goes through this mistake.

How do you think the Judiciary reached this situation? In general, there is a worldwide trend, which is repeated in the United States and Europe, of strengthening the power of the supreme courts and their ability to intervene. At the same time, there is a devaluation of elective positions, both in Parliament and in the Executive. And, in Brazil, this general trend was exacerbated after the monthly allowance.

The Constitution gives the Supreme a lot of power, and the Supreme acts through individual judges in particular cases. And, more than that, it doesn’t finally decide things. It’s the example of when Gilmar Mendes prohibited Lula’s inauguration as minister [de Dilma na Casa Civil] by injunction. After Dilma is impeached, the Supreme Court does not decide on the case, does not decide whether or not the president has full autonomy to appoint his ministers or whether he does not.

In the case of Bolsonaro, action is also being taken in the particular case and not standardizing the general one. It must be made very clear what crime he committed. Will everyone who speaks against the polls not be able to be elected anymore? The PSDB spoke, the PSDB filed a request for an audit of the polls in 2014.

On the other hand, the TSE set a precedent with the case of Fernando Francischini, who attacked the polls with misinformation and was impeached for it. Wouldn’t it be demoralizing to act against a state deputy and not do the same with Bolsonaro? It is necessary to make it clear what rule was established and in what terms Bolsonaro violated this rule. It is clear that what Bolsonaro did is absurd. But it must be noted that he had almost 50% of the votes. Something illegal is not done with Francischini either, but the TSE has to know that he is dealing with a case of another magnitude and must think about his responsibility and the consequences of it.

In this view that the Judiciary is advancing beyond its prerogatives, do you see any possibility of changing this path? I think it is very small given the precedents that the Judiciary itself created and the lack of collegiality of the STF. The Supreme acts always thinking about the political consequences, thinking it has a political role to play since the monthly allowance. The Supreme’s partisanship reached its peak with the performance of a minister like Gilmar Mendes, with the appointments of the Bolsonaro period and now with the appointment of the [Cristiano] Zanin.

With Bolsonaro ineligible, do you think it is possible to have a right-wing option that is more in harmony with the institutions? I don’t like Bolsonaro, I think he’s terrible, I can’t understand how someone votes for him. But he is a political player with a lot of support. Saying ‘let’s pretend Bolsonaro doesn’t exist’ will not solve the problem. No use taking the sofa out of the living room.

How do you see the performance of Minister Alexandre de Moraes? Everyone must recognize that Moraes’ performance was essential to maintain the legitimacy of the electoral result. There he acted as president of the TSE and applied the rules, very skilfully avoiding the various chicanes that the Bolsonaro group tried. An example was the case of blitzes on buses in the Northeast that the Federal Highway Police carried out on election day. Depending on the decision Moraes took, it could create a problem. If it extended the voting deadline, for example, Bolsonaro could judicialize the election. So, acting in a minefield, he managed to bring the election to a successful conclusion without falling into pitfalls.

What should be cherished is the institutional issue, that the Supreme Court use its power with moderation and think about its institutional role and not the role of each of the 11 members.

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X-ray | Fernando Limongi, 65

Professor at FGV and retired professor at the Department of Political Science at USP. PhD in political science from the University of Chicago. Author of “Operação Impeachment” (However, 2023).