Army knew the severity of the crisis on the eve of 1/8 – 08/26/2023 – Power

The leadership of the Brazilian Army knew through its own means of the seriousness of the crisis that was taking shape in Brasilia on January 7th of this year, the eve of the coup attacks against the headquarters of the three Powers in the federal capital.

Until now, it was public that alerts had been produced by Abin (Brazilian Intelligence Agency), subordinate to the GSI (Institutional Security Office), such as the Sheet revealed the day after the attempt by Bolsonarists against the inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT).

These reports were disseminated to various bodies, including the CIE (Center for Army Intelligence). But the military entity produced its own reports, which reached members of its summit informally at least on the Saturday (January 7) prior to the attacks.

The report had access to some of these messages, which were sent via WhatsApp and not through official reports — hence the CIE responded to the 8/1 CPI that it had no reports on what was happening in the camp in front of the Headquarters of the Army, one of the foci of confusion.

Those who received them confirm that there was hesitation to act, partly because, according to the established order, the GSI was responsible for requesting reinforcement of troops from the CMP (Comando Militar do Planalto). Such as Sheet showed in January, it did not.

In any case, there was an unofficial readiness decreed, said people present at the crisis. It didn’t work out very well: if during the coup demonstrations on November 15th, after the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro (PL) to Lula, there were 110 soldiers in the Planalto, the 36 mobilized on January 8th only arrived at the Executive headquarters when the turmoil broke out. it was already installed —Congress and the Supreme Court, also attacked, were not its attributions.

The rest are known problems: there was no work in partnership with the district security forces and there was the bizarre order to allow the demonstrators back from the Esplanada dos Ministérios to return to the camp next to the HQ, where they were armored for one night with the support of two tanks.

Lula was informed that protection was necessary to avoid conflicts, but the fact is that, if Bolsonaristas had not had refuge, they could have been arrested — in the end, in the following morning and afternoon, 1,406 were detained.

The Army’s IPM (Military Police Inquiry) on the case concluded that there was a widespread blackout, with the GSI emerging as the main culprit for the lack of coordination between diverse forces to protect the Planalto Palace and ensure security in Brasilia.

This investigation did not find military crimes in the conduct of public agents, and was referred to the Federal Supreme Court at the request of Minister Alexandre de Moraes, who handles inquiries regarding the Bolsonarist coup. There may be typified, eventually, other transgressions.

In the CIE messages, which may or may not originate from the Abin reports, the already well-known January 8 scenario is described. There was moderate agitation in the camp in front of the Army HQ, but the real coup supporters for the “Selma party”, the informal password for the attack, came in the form of buses financed by Bolsonarist businessmen from different states.

A Sheet questioned the Army about the messages and subsequent referrals, but there was no comment. In one of them, it is mentioned in a tone of doubt that the Military Police of the Federal District had assured that all transports were being inspected and that the situation was calm.

Indeed, almost two weeks ago, the leadership of the district PM was arrested, accused of acting proactively in the biggest coordinated action against Brazilian democracy since the 1964 coup. Forces, to a lesser extent, even for the identification that the four-year symbiosis with Bolsonaro provided.

General officers who were at the center of the crisis complain about this version. According to them, the Army High Command, usually a group of 16 four-star generals, at no time discussed adherence to the coup intentions around the then president and, later, on 8/1.

There was, they agree, strong pressure on the military base for some kind of action against Lula. It is notorious that there were several members of the High Command who sympathized with the coup’s elocubrations, particularly regarding doubts about electronic voting machines. But, according to the version of members of the group, this was barred by the majority position of the collegiate.

At the head of legalism were two generals curiously seen as Bolsonarists: Valério Stumpf and Richard Nunes. In addition to them, Tomás Ribeiro Paiva, who would become the commander of the Force after Lula’s dissatisfaction with the Army’s response to 8/1.

Indeed, these three officers were the target of a smear campaign at the end of last year, promoted by the influential commentator Paulo Figueiredo, grandson of the last general-president of the 1964 dictatorship, João Figueiredo. He made posts and comments calling generals watermelon, slang for those who are green on the outside (the color of the Army uniform) and red on the inside (supposedly a communist).

Returning to the events of January, these same members of the High Command agree that the response was insufficient and that the Force is paying for it, which naturally only worsened due to the history of adherence to Bolsonaro and the revelations of scandalous episodes such as the jewelry sold. in the USA by the then president’s assistant, Mauro Cid, with the help of his father, the respected four-star reserve general of the same name.

Minister José Múcio (Defense) has taken an offensive to try to shield generals in the crisis, talking to members of the CPI, the Federal Supreme Court and the government. So far, the Federal Police has at least 13 active duty military personnel in its sights, including 2 generals.

Múcio has had difficulty accessing the list of soldiers investigated so far in the episode of 8/1, the most acute in institutional terms for the Forces. But his allies list internal measures that have been taken since then.

There were four IPMs. One, that of the CMP who is with Moraes and who has not seen military crimes. The other three, run by the 11th Military Region, which includes Brasília. In one of them, a reserve colonel is denounced for offending generals, while in two others another reserve colonel is accused of preaching the coup in the networks.

There were also four investigations, all within the scope of the CMP. One ended with a warning to a soldier for supporting the demonstrators, another with the temporary arrest of a major who sang the National Anthem with the coup leaders. Another two found no transgressions.

Finally, there were measures outside the military regulations. Lieutenant Colonel Cid lost the nomination, made in May 2022, to command the Special Forces based in Goiânia. His colleague Colonel Jean Lawand Júnior, who urged the then aide-de-camp to encourage Bolsonaro to carry out a coup, was left without promotion to deputy military attache in the United States in 2024.