Covid virus leak thesis cools research – 11/01/2023 – Science

Doubts about the possibility of the Covid-19 virus leaking from a Chinese laboratory have cooled American virus research, reducing funding for researchers involved in collecting and modifying dangerous pathogens and intensifying debate over these practices.

This setback has caused a remarkable transformation in one of the most controversial fields of medical science. While some believe this research could prevent the next pandemic, others fear it will trigger it.

At Pennsylvania State University, a proposal to infect ferrets with a mutant bird flu virus passed the federal government’s most rigorous biosafety review, but was ultimately rejected by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

Troy Sutton, the scientist leading the research, said health authorities advised him to conduct alternative studies because of the public controversy associated with the lab leak theory.

In Washington, international development officials this summer suspended a $125 million program aimed at collecting viruses from animals on several continents, after two Republican senators demanded the project be shut down.

And elsewhere in the United States nearly two dozen virus experts reported a slowdown in sensitive research that spans diverse areas of the profession.

Some spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing putting their funding or careers at risk. Some said they gave up proposing this type of research because their plans were being progressively eroded by the government’s long and opaque reviews.

A virus expert said university administrators asked him to remove his name from a study carried out in partnership with colleagues in China.

The affected experiments include gain-of-function research, which involves genetic modifications to a virus to assess whether they make the pathogen more deadly or contagious.

For advocates of this type of research, there is no more effective way to identify which mutations can make a virus dangerous. These findings, in turn, could help scientists identify the most worrisome pathogens that constantly transition from animals to humans, as well as prepare vaccines that target viruses that pose a risk of triggering a pandemic.

“The next flu pandemic is brewing in the wild, but we have very few ways to stop it or identify which viruses are most dangerous. That freight train is coming, and we need to do everything we can to get ahead of it,” Sutton said.

As these debates intensified and the discovery of forgotten smallpox vials at NIH facilities in 2014, funding for research involving gain of function was temporarily suspended by the Obama administration that year.

Sutton had recently completed his research on bird flu at the University of Maryland, a project that underwent several government reviews and drew criticism from some fellow scientists. He commented to his wife that perhaps it was time to leave academic research.

But the Trump administration lifted the pause and implemented new oversight rules in 2017, the same year Sutton opened his lab at Penn State.

According to the new rules, a specialized government committee would analyze specific proposals related to the gain of function, another step in a verification process that includes laboratory inspections and biosafety analyzes at universities.

The committee maintains the anonymity of its members and does not disclose details about the deliberations. Its oversight is limited to government-funded research, and only three projects have been evaluated to date. This is partly due to the fact that some scientists have chosen not to pursue proposals that could trigger protracted reviews.

But Sutton was not discouraged. He trained in virology at the same hospital in Vancouver where his mother had succumbed to cancer when he was 12. For him, science had fallen short of expectations and, to protect people’s health, researchers needed to investigate new frontiers of disease. His project was the third study related to gain in function to be analyzed by the committee.

‘They didn’t feel comfortable’

Penn State’s high-security laboratory, located in a remote part of the campus, protected by a high fence, works like a vacuum: outside air enters before being expelled through high-efficiency filters, removing potentially contaminated particles.

Before manipulating the viruses, scientists don a battery-powered filtration hooded suit. They change from their normal clothing to protective equipment before starting their work and take a shower to decontaminate themselves before leaving.

It was in this highly controlled environment that, in 2018, Sutton proposed that studies be carried out on bird flu.

The experiments were first vetted at the NIH: an influential group of expert scientists recommended funding. Next came the gain-of-function committee analysis.

Sutton said that the committee scrutinized its study, asking detailed questions about training, equipment and worker screening, and that, in February 2020, it announced that the project was authorized to proceed, on condition that it provide some clarifications. All that was needed was approval from NIH leaders.

But the project soon found itself facing challenges on Capitol Hill. In November 2021, two influential Republicans on the committees overseeing the agency and its funding — Senator Jim Risch of Idaho and Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina — sent a letter demanding details about the endeavor, citing concerns about the federal funding previously earmarked for research in China.

This summer, before fieldwork began, USAID communicated directly to scientists that funding was being canceled. The first report on the decision and objections to the program was reported by the medical journal BMJ.

Dropping out of studies

The opinion of virologists and biosafety experts coincides on one crucial point: the federal government’s approval process is notoriously opaque and excessively slow.

One scientist, who has long received funding from the NIH, reported that one of his proposals, which aimed to deepen understanding of highly contagious variants of the coronavirus, was stuck in public health circles for more than a year.

Erbelding stated that the review process for gain-of-function studies has remained unchanged since its introduction in 2017 and that the increase in the number of research proposals in virology, resulting from the pandemic, may have contributed to the perception that reviews are taking longer. .

The White House is reviewing policies governing oversight of gain-in-role research after a panel of experts approved sweeping reforms this year. However, without clearer guidance, some virology experts have chosen to abandon projects, for fear of becoming targets of congressional investigations or a years-long biosafety review.

“Scientists are moving away from certain areas of research in anticipation of delays and growing bureaucracy. Many parties are becoming more conservative,” said Anice Lowen, an influenza virologist at Emory University.